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Abstract - Australia assigns and allocates spectrum

using three broad types of regulatory approaches;
command and control, property rights and open
access. Each approach entails numerous pros and
cons, buttressed by uncertainties over future
consumer demand, interference management,
barriers to entry, and technological evolution. The
development and commercialisation of dynamic
spectrum access technologies (DSA) requires new
regulatory approaches. This article discusses an array
of intermediary, dynamically efficient spectrum
management approaches, which may make better use
of DSA opportunities. The article then discusses the
practical hurdles and legal challenges posed by their
adoption and regulation in an Australian context.
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s, various OECD countries have
assigned and allocated the radio spectrum to specific users and
services using three broad regulatory regimes; command and
control (C&C), property rights and open access. Command
and control is a managed licensing regime in which the degree
of user discretion with regard to service and technology
neutrality is either nonexistent or minimal. The property rights
regime is an exclusive licensing regime in which ‘owners’
have significant discretion (‘rights’) in the selection of the
technologies and services to be deployed in their licence area.
Property rights also encourage the creation of secondary
markets in which spectrum can be traded or leased. The open
access approach is an unlicensed or non-exclusive licensed
1
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regime in which every user has identical usage rights provided
they adhere to a specific set of rules and equipment standards.
Analysts’ views and recommendations on these regulatory
approaches differ widely. Over the years, an ‘either or’ debate
raised by various reformist factions has raised a large number
of relevant concerns. There is now a significant and vigorous
literature debating the benefits and drawbacks of these three
regulatory regimes.
In our view this reform debate has erred, fixated on the
need to promote either property rights and markets or open
access regimes. Arguments have stressed the mutually
exclusive nature of these regimes [1-5]. However, this
polarisation of opinions is an unnecessary distraction.
Property rights and unlicensed approaches mostly compete for
different markets, services and devices, and should in fact
better be viewed as complementary rather than rival
approaches.
A consensual view, perhaps, is that the selection of a
regulatory regime should be carefully adapted to the
circumstances of the services considered (e.g. underlying
context and market, public or private good nature of the
service, technologies used, strategic importance of innovation
policy, etc.).
Beyond the ideological nature of the debate, these
regulatory approaches are also part of a wider dilemma over
how to appropriate and distribute the rents generated by
exclusive or semi-exclusive wireless access rights [6, 7, 5, 8].
The property rights regime has been particularly polemical
among academic and policy researchers2. Although it has
proved very successful among spectrum privatising countries3,
numerous commentators have stressed the potential for ‘hold
ups’ which generate idle or underused private spectrum
legally inaccessible to other potential users. This view of
2

The most recent contributions to this ‘either or’ debate include Refs. [9-15, 4,
16-18]
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These countries consist of Australia, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, New
Zealand, the USA and, very recently, the United Kingdom. Except for
Guatemala, which enshrined property rights in legal deeds, property rights in
these countries are usually implicitly rather than explicitly defined.
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private spectrum as fenced oligopolistic enclaves is not shared
by all. For instance, Hazlett [5] recently suggested that
nonspecific expansion of property rights may increase
competitiveness in wireless markets - as opposed to the static
quasi-monopolies granted through command and control.
While this argument is empirically tested and appears valid, in
practice it ignores that property rights regimes also generally
provide more entrenched legal rights (such as the rights not to
tolerate secondary access or the right to be compensated for
relocation costs) than command and control regimes (since the
government can always modulate by decree the desired degree
of exclusivity). More entrenched access rights for some users
may well reduce opportunities to fully and dynamically
exploit idle spectrum for other users.
Recent advances in the development and commercialisation
of dynamic spectrum access technologies (DSA) require the
regulatory framework to adapt flexibly to opportunities for
greater spectrum utilisation. With DSA wireless networks,
secondary users can access idle spectrum opportunities
dynamically to transmit their signals whenever primary users
do not use their licensed spectrum. .Much of the discussion
has so far focused on uncertainties surrounding the
commercial deployment of DSA technologies. There has also
been much debate as to whether these technologies would
favour a licensed or an ‘unlicensed’ approach to spectrum
management. Although this question has been answered many
times [19, 13, 16], it is essentially the wrong question [20].
This article takes a step back from the ‘either or’
dichotomy, which characterises much of this literature. It
examines instead an array of intermediary—rather than
extreme—spectrum management approaches that would be
required to unleash the full potential of commercially
deployable DSA technologies. The article argues that
spectrum efficiency would be improved through the
implementation
of
these
intermediary
approaches.
Furthermore, we discuss the practical hurdles and legal
challenges posed by the adoption and regulation of DSA
technologies in order to enable new spectrum management
regimes in an Australian context.
The article is structured as follows: the first section presents
the ‘trichotomic’ set of radiocommunications systems in
Australia and the spectrum management regimes they enable.
The second section succinctly presents a taxonomy of
spectrum management regimes. The third section presents a
set of dynamically efficient intermediary regimes under this
taxonomy and records attempts to implement some of these
regimes in Australia. The fourth section discusses which of
these intermediary regimes would best enable the
opportunities presented by DSA technologies. The fifth
section discusses the state of adoption of DSA technology in
Australia and the regulatory hurdles in adopting or
experimenting with DSA-efficient regimes in Australia.

LICENSING SPECTRUM RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA
Spectrum policy reforms started in the late 1980s in
Australia, culminating in the Radiocommunications Act 1992
(the Act) and the first auction of spectrum licences in 19974.
The Act defines the operations of three radiocommunications
licensing regimes; apparatus, spectrum and class licences,
which map (imperfectly) with command and control, property
rights and open access approaches, respectively.
Apparatus licensing is a device-centric approach, where the
operation of every radiocommunications device is authorised
through a transmitter or receiver licence. Most of the time, this
device-centric regime is highly prescriptive, specifying the
type of service, technology and equipment standards, along
with tight technical conditions about site, band, power, and
emission types. The Australian Communications and Media
Authority (ACMA) has specified different types of apparatus
licence that generally align with service designations in the
ITU Radio Regulations.
However, not all apparatus licences fit the stereotype of an
arch-rigid management regime ruled by government-fiat. For
example, the 1993 launch of second generation (2G) GSM
digital mobile telephone services in Australia was enabled by
technologically flexible (but service-specific) apparatus
licences for frequencies in the 900 MHz band. These licences
allowed the use of any technology to provide digital mobile
telephone services and today both 2G (GSM) and 3G
(WCDMA) technologies are deployed in the 900 MHz band.
Also, the Act was amended in 1995 to allow the trading of
apparatus licences and third party operations (e.g. leasing),
which introduced a degree of market flexibility to the system.
Spectrum licences were introduced in the 1992 Act, and the
first spectrum licences were issued in 1997. Spectrum licences
confer leasehold ownership rights to licensees for fixed terms
of 15 years. Overall, these spectrum licences cover a relatively
small portion of the entire spectrum, but include the most
highly valued bands. There are currently about 10 spectrum
licensed bands.
Spectrum licences are typically ‘service-neutral’ and ‘spacecentric’.
They
permit
users
to
operate
any
radiocommunications devices in a given ‘spectrum space’5
subject to respecting the requirements of a technical
framework. Core conditions of the spectrum licence specify
the band, the area, and the maximum permitted level of radio
emissions outside its boundaries. Other conditions specify
which transmitters are required to be registered to certify they
will not cause unacceptable levels of interference outside the
boundaries of the licence. Advisory guidelines assist

4

Note that there were auctions of apparatus licences as early as 1994 and 1995.
A spectrum space is a large band specified in terms of its underlying area,
population density, terrain, prospective services and interference rights
(receiver and transmitter). Once fully specified, the spectrum space allows a
higher degree of freedom in usage and is generally favoured by large operators.
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interference assessments between spectrum licensed devices
and services operating under apparatus or class licences.
Spectrum licences have added much flexibility to
radiocommunications management in Australia. But there are
several areas of controversy such as licence renewal
uncertainty and spectrum idleness in several spectrumlicensed bands. For example, spectrum licenses in the 500
MHz band (two way radio) have been little used, and some
spectrum licenses in the lower 800 MHz band (mobile
phones), 2.3 GHz and 3.6 GHz bands (broadband and
WiMAX) have seen no or little network deployment.
Class licensing is a technology-centric approach to
spectrum management that operates on an open and shared
access basis. Class licences do not need to be applied for or
issued to individuals, and in that sense are the equivalent of
‘unlicensed’ approaches in other countries. There is no
exclusivity in usage and no fee to be paid. For these reasons,
class licences are sometimes referred to as ‘public parks’ or
‘open access’ regimes. A class licence sets out some minimal
operational conditions, which can include band, power, types
of device and emissions, standards compliance, and
geographic deployment constraints. Many class licences
operate as non-interfering secondary usage easements in
apparatus licensed bands or within shared bands such as ISM
bands.
Since class licences are not issued to individuals, the
licence conditions are not applied nor tailored to individual
users. Class licences do not lapse, they continue until they are
revoked or amended. Transmissions under class licensees are
not allowed to interfere with other services and are not
provided protection from interferences generated by other
services. Thus, the spectrum access and usage rights granted
through this regime are relatively basic and generally
unsuitable for larger radiocommunications operators, such as
telecommunications carriers with long-term infrastructure
projects and quality of service obligations to their customers.
The services and devices authorised under class licences are
usually restricted to short-range, low-power applications.
The early liberalisation of spectrum access in Australia
through spectrum and class licensing regimes has proved very
successful, enabling the flexible adoption of numerous
wireless innovations and a fast spread of broadband services
[16].
THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL REGULATORY SPACE
Taken together, these three licensing regimes allow the
ACMA to provide flexible management responses to a large
array of demands put on the spectrum. After all, due to its
geographical isolation and its strong commitment to
management reforms Australia has been at the forefront of
spectrum management liberalisation for nearly two decades.

The vigorous reform policies pursued by the SMA6, the ACA
and now the ACMA have transformed old bureaucratic rules
into one of the most economically efficient, flexible and
transparent licensing systems in the world.
Yet, there are still important challenges facing spectrum
management policy in Australia. On the one hand there are
limitations to the licensing regimes currently used and on the
other hand the fast pace of technological development requires
a continuous re-think of past arrangements and anticipation of
future needs. The more flexible, adaptable and responsive the
licensing structure is in meeting these challenges, the better
the potential to fully exploit the regimes’ potential, and
efficiently deliver socio-economic benefits.
The three licensing regimes set out the rights and
obligations of spectrum users in Australia. Although the
licensing regimes differ in many respects, they also have
common denominators. For instance, they all impose a
minimal set of ‘core’ specifications about frequency,
bandwidth, area, power and emission types, although the way
these conditions are integrated in practice does vary. In
general, apparatus and spectrum licensing have more in
common than class licensing. Both provide some degree of
exclusivity and interference protection in spectrum access
rights. Both licences can be auctioned, leased or traded, and
are subject to regulatory approval for licence renewal - though
on very different terms.
Table I below illustrates the typical features of each
licensing regime as a set of specific coordinates in a multidimensional space7.
TABLE I
AUSTRALIAN LICENSING REGIMES - MAIN DIMENSIONS
Attributes
Apparatus Lic.
Spectrum Lic.
Class Lic.
Regime focus
Device-centric
Space-centric
Tech-centric
Exclusivity
Medium to High
Very high
None
Neutrality (T, S)
None to Moderate
Hi High
variable
Assignment by
Admin P, Auction
Auction
Not assigned
Individual assigned
Yes or No
Yes
No
Price / Fee
Admin P / market P
Market P
None
Tenure and Term
5 years/renewable
15 years
Unlimited
Interference protect.
Provided
Provided
Not provided
Rights certainty
Moderate
High
Low
Tradability
Moderate
High
Not relevant
Sub-division
Not allowed
Allowed
Not relevant
Coordination needed
High
High
Low
Coordination by
Regulator
Licensee
Tech-governed
Service neutrality
Usually none
High
High or low
Technical conditions
Basic
Complex
Basic
(T,S) stands for Technology and Service neutrality ; P stands for Price.

6

The Spectrum Management Authority (SMA) was merged with the Australian
Telecommunications Authority (AUSTEL) on 1 July 1997 to form the
Australian Communications Authority (ACA), later to become the ACMA
after merging with the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) in 2005.
7
Note that some apparatus and class licences will not correspond to this
depiction, which, instead, attempts to describe representative licences.
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Although the table focuses on 15 important dimensions,
potentially, the number of dimensions characterising any
spectrum management regime is much larger. By changing the
coordinates taken by any regime in the multi-dimensional
space (say replacing ‘high’ by ‘low’ degree of), one obtains
theoretically another regime. Table I therefore suggests the
existence of a near infinity of spectrum management regimes.
Many of these potential regimes would present limited or no
interest to regulators, but others would be of interest in
specific situations. Clearly, there are more than just three
options on the table.
Working with 15 dimensions is however not practical.
Intermediary licensing regimes could be defined based on four
key dimensions presented in table I [21, 22].
Service and Technological Neutrality, reflects the degree of
licensee discretion in deciding which services to provide on
the band, and in selecting and setting equipments standards. In
Australia, several dynamic regimes are technology-neutral but
service-rigid in practice. Neutrality is allocative efficient [5,
23] but may reduce technical efficiency by making
coordination with other technologies difficult.
Band Exclusivity, describes the degree of exclusivity
conferred to licensee rights. For instance, a very exclusive
regime allows licensees (primary users) to negate access to
any potential secondary users (right of exclusion). A very
exclusive regime would also be expected to confer a high
degree of rights certainty to licensees.
Rights Assignment, refers to the mechanism by which the
selected regime transfers rights to licensees; price mechanisms
(e.g. auctions), administrative pricing, arbitrary fees, or no
assignment. This dimension might also distinguish between
rights assigned to an individual entity or to a community at
large.
Rules Coordination, determines the authority to set rules
and protocols for efficient interference management. All
licensing regimes require a minimum set of rules to keep
interferences under check, but some regimes will grant a large
degree of autonomy to licensees or users, other will rely on
the legal system, and other still will rely on government
authority.
Transferrability and liability, refers to the possibility to
trade or lease frequencies. This dimension will include
different variants of liability towards the regulator (and
eventual harmed third parties) in case licenses are misused. In
case the licenses are leased, this will range from the transfer of
all liability to the lessee to keeping full responsibility for the
use of the band with the lessor.
Following this nomenclature, the property rights regime
consists of service neutral licenses and sharply defined
exclusivity rights. Easements for secondary usage are subject
to owners’ approval and may need to be purchased.
Interferences are managed among owners within a set of legal
and technical rules. Expropriation would require due

compensation. Licenses are fully transferrable and residual
liability rights will be negotiated with the primary user.
Open access lies at the other end; no exclusivity rights, selfmanagement of interferences under minimal government
guidelines. Service and technology neutrality are tolerated to
the extent that they remain compatible with the interference
coordination rules (which may for instance require
compatibility in technological standards). Licenses are not
individually assigned nor can they be traded or leased.
DYNAMICALLY EFFICIENT INTERMEDIARY REGIMES
This simple model allows defining a set of dynamically
efficient intermediary regimes for instance combining aspects
of a property rights regime, with those of a C&C or an open
access regime, as summarised in Table II. For instance, a
common pool is a community of users operating under
conditions of service and technological neutrality in a given
spectrum band. The spectrum is shared access within the
community, but rights are collectively-owned (and so more
exclusive than under open access) and coordination rules are
set and enforced by community management. If membership
and sharing rules are decided by government, the regime may
be described as collective command and control.
TABLE II
DYNAMICALLY EFFICIENT INTERMEDIARY REGIMES
Regime
Neutrality
Rights
Assignment
Rules
Private Commons
Flexible
FPR
AT
SC
Private Parks
Flexible
FPR
AT
SC
Public park
Flexible
CU
UB
GM
Collective C&C
Rigid
RCU
AL
GM
Common pool
Flexible
RCU
AL/UB
SC
Easement
Flexible
EPR
AT
GM
Market easement
Flexible
EPR
AT
SC
Regulated easement
Rigid
EPR
AT
GM
Eased C&C
Rigid
EPR
AL/AT
GM
Flexi-eased C&C
Flexible
EPR
AL/AT
GM
Transferability
Australian Examples
Private commons
High
:
Private parks
High
:
Public park
None
class licences
Collective C&C
Low
Non assigned apparatus licences
Common pool
Low
:
Easement
Medium
MOST radio telescope on 843 MHz
Market easement
High
Authorised under spectrum licences
Regulated easement
Medium
Auctioned apparatus licences
Eased C&C
Medium
Most apparatus licences
Flexi-eased C&C
Variable
Some class and apparatus licenses
C&C = Command and Control; FPR = Full property rights; EPR = Eased property
rights, RCU = Restricted collective use, AL = Administrative licensing; AT =
Auctioned licences and market trading; UB = Unlicensed band; SC = Self-controlled,
GM = Government managed

A private commons is a similar arrangement worked out
through a contract between the community of users and the
band owner. A private park regime is a membership-based,
fee-based licensing approach relying on device registration
and self-coordination rules by users. In its operations, the
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private park is somewhat closer to a commons than a property
rights regime, yet rights are individually rather than
collectively owned.
An easement is a situation by which the government
enforces secondary usage rights over the flexible rights held
by primary users (e.g. telecommunications carriers). A
regulated easement is a similar situation but in a context of
service and technological rigidity such as where primary
users’ rights derive from a C&C regime. A market easement
let these secondary rights be negotiated through markets rather
than through government intervention.
C&C regimes can also be re-packaged, say to tolerate noninterfering easements for secondary users (Eased C&C) or
grant service-neutral usage (Flexible C&C, similar to the
regime governing the ‘GSM’ licences in the 900 MHz band
discussed above) or both (flexi-eased C&C).
It is notable from Table II that Australia has most used
intermediate regimes where government is the primary or a
significant rule maker. These are enabled by different rules
surrounding apparatus and class licensing. There has been a
much narrower range of regimes used where the private sector
has taken the lead. Theoretically spectrum licensing could
enable many different regimes under private control. In
practice, spectrum licensees have operated large systems and
allowed very little or no use by third parties. The reasons have
been much debated and have lead to several attempted
expansions of the set of regulatory approaches.
For example, in 2001, the ACA made a submission to a
Government inquiry [24], suggesting consolidation of the 3
licensing regimes authorised under the Act into one generic
licence type. The generic licence would have enabled the
ACA to build bespoke licences ensuring best fit between user,
service and band [25]. This suggestion was not adopted
although it was consistent with the object of the Act (as well
as with the Principles for Spectrum Management that the
ACMA adopted in 2009), which emphasizes both the quest for
high-value allocation and efficient band usage.
Later on, and in order to increase dynamic efficiency in
some frequency bands, the ACMA suggested issuing ‘private
park’ licences for wireless access services (WAS). Future
WAS needs seemed suited to a service-neutral regime
authorizing any number and type of interoperable base
stations in a licensed space with band coordination undertaken
by users – in short a regime combining aspects of spectrum
and class licensing. The ACMA contemplated issuing shareduse licences directly to users8. Furthermore, devices would be
expected to use dynamic frequency selection techniques in
8

Note that spectrum licenses in principle authorise their owners to operate a
similar regime, since spectrum spaces can be subdivided, and traded or leased
to third parties on owners’ conditions. However, the private park is initiated by
government, and seeks commons-like coordination rules within the park rather
than hierarchical property-based rules. Such a regime has not arisen under the
management freedoms granted spectrum licenses.

similar fashion to class-licensed devices. Finally, there would
be no seniority privileges, and no ‘hard’ licence boundaries although base stations would have to be sited within the
geographical area of the licence.
Since the enforcement of easements for secondary users in
spectrum licensed space is effectively prohibited under the
Act (even when the spectrum is permanently left idle by its
owners), the private park regime was meant to induce more
dynamic operations in what are currently spectrum-licensed
spaces. In a Private Park, the definition of shared rights should
induce users of similar size and background to coordinate and
self-manage their services on different geographical spectrum
spaces within the band [26, 27]. Although there is still
regulatory interest in the potential for private parks to be a
dynamically-efficient response to future WAS needs, Private
Park arrangements have not yet been developed or
implemented in Australia.
DSA TECHNOLOGIES, PROPERTY RIGTHS AND COMMONS
DSA technologies consist of a motley array of spectrum
sharing techniques, driven by digital signal processing . The
better known examples are (i) spread-spectrum and UltraWide Band technologies, which spread non-sinusoidal signals
over a wide frequency range at very lower power per
frequency band, (ii) smart antennae, which represent an
intelligent
spectrum
re-use
technology
cancelling
interferences by spatial coding, (iii) software-defined radios,
which process signals through general processors and can thus
receive and transmit various types of waveforms by using
different softwares (e.g. automatic frequency selection in
modern radios), and (iv) cognitive radio, which builds on SDR
technology to sense idle spectrum, analyses the vacant slot
and its environment to decide whether to occupy it (in a ‘listen
before talk’ logic) and once a decision is made, the radio
guides prospective signals towards the unused spectrum.
It has often been argued in the policy literature on spectrum
management that DSA technologies (often referred to as ‘the
technology’) represent a great promise to expand the open
access regime to much larger shares of the radio spectrum
than it currently occupies [28, 29, 12]. In that perspective,
open access is a dynamically superior regime to property
rights, because the latter is inherently dynamically inefficient
by force of being too exclusive and therefore entailing high
transaction costs for secondary usage. Incorporating power
limits and listen-before-talk protocols into the hardware
reduces transaction costs between negotiating parties to their
bare minimum. Open access and collective ownership also
induce collaboration and generally offer much more
favourable terrain for innovation [30]. Without commercially
deployable DSA technologies though, the threat of
interference and ‘tragedy of the commons’ outcomes is
conspicuous for higher power services such as broadcasting
and WAS where there is a need for coordination to minimise
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interference. There is general agreement that open access is
currently a very successful way to manage short-range, lowpower applications. However, suitably designed and
commercially operational DSA technologies are a necessary
condition to expand open access to different types of
applications.
Economists and other proponents of the property rights
regime argue that open access is therefore too dependent on
the promise of DSA technologies9. Cognitive radio technology
still has to clear important barriers if it is to contribute
significantly to dynamic spectrum usage. The difficulties of
sensing idle spectrum in the presence of geophysical
obstacles, the ‘hidden terminal’ issue, doubts about the costeffectiveness of these technologies,10 indicate just how
complex the way ahead is. As is well known, software-defined
radio technologies have been discovered and used by the US
Military for many decades. The fact that they are filtering very
slowly and very selectively from the military to the civilian
domain and are still not widely available for most civilian
radiocommunications applications illustrates the uncertainties
for regulatory planning.
Ultra Wide Band is a much less complex matter since the
technology is available and already operational in many
places, usually under an unlicensed arrangement (i.e. a class
licence in Australia). However the matter of interference with
devices operated under other technologies in a confined space
remains open. Past controversies about the legally acceptable
noise floor of UWB devices have generated a lengthy legal
process for UWB authorisation in the US [32]. Australia, New
Zealand and EU countries have since authorised some UWB
applications especially for imaging, vehicular radar and homenetworking applications. Higher power applications such as
ground-breaking radar remain in doubt. Yet, the relative
success of UWB technology does not solve much. Because it
trades so much power for bandwidth, UWB applications are
short-range, just like Wi-Fi, and so UWB provides no gateway
for an open access regime of a very different nature to Wi-Fi.
In particular it offers little promise for high power
communications applications.
Without ready-to-use DSA technologies, open access does
not represent a credible solution beyond the short-range
devices it currently authorises. What is more, even if DSA
technologies were fully operational, the very strength of
demand for wireless applications is growing at such a pace

that DSA technologies would only realistically offer a shortterm patch-up to current bottlenecks.
By contrast economists emphasise that the property rights
approach efficiently does solve excess demand through
pricing and access rationing. Assuming the price mechanism
operates without distortions, these instruments guarantee that
excess demand remains under check (market imperfections
leading to price distortions remaining the matter of
government regulation).
Furthermore, the property rights approach can also make
efficient use of DSA technologies, as these technologies
enable spectrum owners inclined on spectrum trading to find
more efficient ways to let secondary users access and use their
bands. Gerald Faulhaber neatly concluded this argument by
stressing that ‘[DSA] technology is neutral regarding the
overarching legal regime’ ([13] p. 268).
Economists have also questioned whether Wi-Fi and similar
unlicensed experiments might not in fact represent a
repackaged property rights approach in which rights are
defined over the coverage range, with large operators (e.g.
universities or airports) securing exclusive rights over specific
areas [33, 16]. In that sense, unlicensed approaches do not
quite provide open access, but merely redefines access rights
in a different way.
These arguments and counter-arguments have led to a
stalemate between partisans of the most dynamically efficient
solution and those of the most economically rational (and
allocative efficient) solution. However, this debate has almost
turned satirical. Even without DSA technologies, open access
has indeed proved successful in some areas (e.g. Wi-Fi on 2.4
GHz) but disappointing or disastrous in others (e.g. US UPCS bands on 1.9 GHz, or U-NII bands on 5.2 GHz and many
more). Similarly, the property rights regime in Australia has
seen significant network deployment and spectrum trading on
ITU designed mobile phone bands (800 MHz, 900 MHz11, 1.8
GHz and 2.0 GHz). Other bands have shown significant
trading, but band idleness has been quite common. Licensees
in all bands have shown an almost universal reluctance to
allow secondary use [22, 34].
It seems the property rights approach has not so far
provided an avenue for dynamically efficient spectrum usage
by multiple users. The experience in Australia is that spectrum
licences (which confer property rights12) have generally been
quite successful in technical and allocative terms, but they
proved to be very monolithic. They occupy large portions of
spectrum in very exclusive ways. Although spectrum licences

9

Note that the inverse argument is often heard in the industry. According to
this view, the commercial deployment of DSA technologies will only become
interesting with the regulatory organization of a spectrum management system
that is heterogeneous and dynamic rather than one that is homogeneous and
proprietary. We contrast these views in the next section.
10
See for instance [31] p. 7-13 and [13] p. 265 for a discussion. Most of these
problems have solutions but they require some kind of return to command and
control type interventions.

11
As stressed earlier, the 900 MHz band has not been spectrum licensed and
represents a unique example of Flexi C&C regime, with some degree of
technological neutrality and similar trading and leasing rights to spectrum
licenses, albeit with much less formal certainty in the duration of the access
rights.
12
Legal scholars might dispute that leasehold constitutes property since it that
regime, the ultimate owner remains the Government.
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were designed as a tool to allow market function, the large
spectrum-licensed spaces they control are monopolised by the
high spectrum-consuming technologies deployed on these
bands. Can licensees realistically be expected to allow large
amounts of secondary use, while their primary goal is to
guarantee a quality of service for their prime network? Under
these conditions, some degree of regulatory action may be
needed to increase the yield of spectrum-licensed spaces by
allowing non-interfering secondary usage by low-power,
spread-spectrum or UWB devices. This suggests an important
role for intermediate legal regimes to allow DSA
technologies. The challenge for regulators is to set up
intermediate regimes that retain the benefits of a market
driven property-rights approach for the primary allocation.
DSA TECHNOLOGIES AND ALTERNATIVE REGIMES
DSA technologies are a plus for any management regime.
The question is which regime presents the best environment
for their full use. We argue in this article that intermediary
regimes would better respond to this promise because they are
focused on improved access (thus addressing the matter of
exclusivity and idleness) while still limiting the number of
users in various different ways (thus addressing the matter of
congestion and tragedy of the commons).
By contrast, the problems of excessive exclusivity and low
usage that can be presented by a property rights are not
resolved by DSA technology. If an owner is opposed to
secondary usage because she does not accept that managing
other users is part of her core business, the presence of new
technologies may do little to change her resolve.
Similarly, the problems of excessive interference,
overcrowding and quality of service under an unlicensed
(class licensed) approach may not be solved for long with the
adoption of properly working DSA technologies.
Additionally, there are many situations where tragedy of the
commons can arise even with properly working DSA
technologies—see for instance ‘greedy design’ arguments
discussed in Refs. [35, 36]. Unlicensed approaches raise
issues of compliance with shared-used policies, of secondary
usage coexistence with primary licensees, and the potential
matter of technological supremacy (e.g. the WiMax debate).
The importance of having as many alternatives available to
manage the spectrum in a dynamically efficient way is well
recognised by most experts. In his discussion of the standard
government-imposed easement model suggested in ref. [37],
Martin Cave recently stressed that ‘it is unlikely that there will
be a corner solution with the same regime optimal in all
frequencies’ ([19] p. 230). Other proponents of the property
rights approach would agree. William Baumol and Dorothy
Robyn for instance add that ‘any good rules will have to be
readily changeable as demand, used, technology and any other
critical determinants evolve in unpredictable ways…Rather ,
redesign of the current spectrum governance regime has been

discussed in terms of the choices between two fundamentally
different alternatives’ ([33] p. 3).
Intuitively wireless applications that require guaranteed
spectrum access at very short notice (e.g. emergency services)
will require a different treatment than services operated on a
continuous basis (e.g. broadcasting), or those that require
guarantees of long-term access to justify large investments in
infrastructure and market development (e.g. third and fourth
generation networks). There is an endless list of services,
technologies, users and markets all with different priorities
and requiring different types of rights.
Thus, what this debate misses is recognition that there are
many more choices than just open access and property rights,
that these additional regimes are an important addition to the
debate, and that they also can make optimal use of the
opportunities offered by DSA technologies. Since these
regimes are inherently more dynamically efficient, by
encouraging an increased number of users on any given band,
it would be intuitive that their combination with a set of
operational DSA technologies would conduce to better
economic outcomes. What benefit is a technology such as
cognitive radio if it is not used due to a legal impasse (say
because a spectrum owner is concerned for the quality of
service of its networks), or if demand is such that the spectrum
is permanently congested?
Intermediary regimes show the way ahead to remedy these
likely shortcomings, and they are all well designed to make
best use of DSA technology. For instance, if spectrum owners
such as 3G network operators were required (rather than
merely authorised at the moment) to manage their spectrum as
a private commons, it is likely that this would take place by
widespread adoption of spread spectrum and UWB
technologies, since, as discussed earlier the amount of
bandwidth required to operate a 3G network would leave little
room for secondary users (except for less dense geographical
areas, where traffic can be quiet for long periods of time).
Cognitive radio would be just as welcome since the large
bandwidth needed in a 3G network is nonetheless not
permanently used, nor in all geographical locations.
This could be done under an easement model by providing
legislation that allows non-interfering devices to operate under
a certain noise floor level, as was the case with UWB in the
US. This process can prove controversial (and has been in the
US where no real property rights existed).
A softer approach is to encourage the establishment of
private commons. How does one induce a spectrum owner to
run a private commons? Regulators may create a structure of
private incentives such as a scale of rights based on spectrum
usage (low usage implying later demotion to a lesser rights
regime). On this basis, a spectrum owner that makes little use
of the resource can nevertheless keep ownership rights by
operating a private commons. A private commons would
differ from an easement model in that the owner selects
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secondary users rather than have coexistence imposed by
regulatory rule. Alternatively, if these reforms prove
intractable, the Government may want to keep some spectrum
licences for itself to encourage the development of private
commons.
The private park is a different matter, since the requirement
to collaborate with different users is in-built from the start,
and is therefore not premised on any easement conditions. A
private park licensee would know up-front that its sharedspace licence would make optimal use of the spectrum
through sharing between co-owners and extensive use of DSA
technology. In the private park, idle spectrum detected, say by
cognitive radio, can be readily used since the individual
licences would authorise shared use. Devices registration and
an upper limit on the number of park owners (based on
underlying market for the likely services and population
density in the geographical area considered) would help
guarantee quality of service. The common pool approach does
not differ markedly from the private parks as far as the use of
DSA technologies is concerned, the main difference residing
in joint rights ownership rather than shared private rights.
Public parks and device parks by contrast are quite widely
operated for services that are not severely affected by quality
of services issues. They are often conflated with the open
access regime (which assumes much less regulatory
intervention than observed in these parks). They make
intensive use of spectrum sharing technologies on a
coexistence basis, i.e. equipments are built to avoid
interferences but in most cases devices do not communicate
with each other.
Finally, eased and flexi-eased C&C regimes also facilitate
the adoption and the potential use of DSA technologies, by
preserving some degree of regulatory discretion to introduce
spectrum sharing in bands that are mostly fallow. Because
users rights are less extensive and less certain than under
property rights, these regimes are less ideal for services
requiring important infrastructure investment.
Two fundamental features define each of these intermediary
regimes; (i) whether they are premised on collaboration or
coexistence, and (ii) whether users are endowed equal or
hierarchically-defined rights [38]. The private commons is
collaborative but hierarchical while the private park is
collaborative but egalitarian. Similarly, the coexistence of the
public park is egalitarian while the coexistence of the
easement model is hierarchical. The eased and flexi-eased
models are also hierarchical.
Collaborative models will require much stronger sharing
protocols (and institutions to enforce them) than, say, the
current equipment standards used for Wi-Fi. And so
collaborative approaches will be harder to integrate with DSA
technologies than coexistence models. Egalitarian approaches
will be more flexible and more dynamic than hierarchicallydefined regimes because they reduce or remove the

authorisation requirements of the latter, but they should be
restricted to services with limited users to mitigate against
tragedy of the commons outcomes, and where quality of
service is not a major issue.
PRACTICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO REGULATING DSA
TECHNOLOGIES IN AUSTRALIA
The emergence of DSA technologies provides a challenge
to the Australian radiocommunications licensing system set up
by the passage of the 1992 Act. The Act provides sufficient
flexibility for the regulator to licence DSA technologies in
some circumstances but a more comprehensive licensing
toolbox may enable better solutions.
To provide an example of legal/regulatory hurdles facing
regulators in the usage of DSA technologies (beyond
authorisation issues), consider the following hypothetical case.
Theoretically ACMA can issue class licences on a band prior
to the band being specified for spectrum licensing. The design
of the class licence may well be based on assumption about
cognitive radio developments over the next 15 years. Yet,
once the band is specified for spectrum licensing, it becomes
very difficult to for the ACMA to amend the class licence
because the Act significantly constrains the ability of the
ACMA to do so once a band is specified for spectrum
licensing13. So, if cognitive radio happens to behave
differently than expected there may be several long-term
regulatory problems to solve (e.g. spectrum licensees
complaining about not having the usage rights – such as
quality of service rights – they expected to obtain).
The widespread adoption of DSA technologies may well
require a re-think of the entire system of registering licences
and assigning new services. The regulator maintains the
licence register to contain all the data required to assign new
licences so that they do not interfere with existing services.
Searchable fields, including centre frequency, bandwidth and
site location allow almost automatic frequency assignment of
traditional radiocommunications services. However, as
currently specified, the register does not contain all details that
would be needed to assign systems (whether DSA or not) in a
DSA environment. While DSA systems are a rarity over most
of the spectrum, they can be accommodated as exceptions, but
greater sophistication will be required as DSA becomes
common.
A third regulatory challenge arising from the widespread
adoption of DSA technologies will be the pricing of spectrum.
More sophisticated auction methodologies may be required to
efficiently allocate spectrum for use by DSA technologies and
systems that do not absolutely deny spectrum to other services
but do impose constraints on those other services.
Administratively set prices also will need to be set in a more
13

Strictly speaking, frequency bands are either designated or declared for
spectrum licensing depending on the particular legislative pathway used.
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sophisticated way to allow for the impact of DSA
technologies and systems.
INTERMEDIATE REGIMES UNDER CURRENT LEGISLATION
The dynamically efficient intermediate regimes identified
earlier may be licensed in the following ways in Australia.
TABLE III
LICENSING INTERMEDIARY REGIMES IN AUSTRALIA
Regime
Licence system
Ownership
Current status
Private commons
spectrum
common
allowed-unused
Private parks
spectrum
single
allowed-unused
Public park
class
..
commonly used
Collective C&C
apparatus
common
commonly used
Common pool
apparatus/class
common
unused
Easement
spectrum
single
partly allowed
Market easement
spectrum
easement
rarely used
Regulated easement
spectrum
easement
commonly used
Eased C&C
apparatus
easement
commonly used
Flexi-eased C&C
apparatus
easement
commonly used

The private commons regime ideally arises when a group of
access seekers collectively own a spectrum space and operate
within it according to rules of there own devising. However, a
private commons has not been tried in Australia. There has
been no interest from spectrum users and there are doubts
about the practical aspects of property rights to spectrum held
by tenants in common basis. However, the regime is allowed
by the Act; it just requires a coalition to jointly purchase a
spectrum licence and run it as a commons.
A private park is a similar concept, but where ownership of
a spectrum licence is held by a single licensee (which may be
collectively owned), which operates access on commons
basis. This is allowed under the current regime; it requires a
licensee to issue third party authorisations to other spectrum
users. There has been no take up of this approach in Australia
with anecdotal reports that spectrum licensees are reluctant to
enter into third party authorisations.
Interestingly, it is the case that the apparatus licence
arrangements in the 2.5 GHz band and the collaborative
operational practices of the television broadcasters who hold
those licences have arguably produced an outcome that has
some of the attributes of the private commons and private park
regimes.
A market easement is an easement to a spectrum licence
where the details of the easement are controlled by the
spectrum licensee. This is allowed in Australia by way of
third-party authorisations to spectrum licences. The degree to
which this type of arrangement is used is not known but many
access seekers have reported dissatisfaction with the
difficultly of negotiating such arrangements. The ACMA has
identified impediments to third party authorisations, which it
is addressing.

Collective command and control is commonly used, for
example in non assigned apparatus licences. Public parks are
the extensively used class licensing regime.
Different types of easement to a spectrum property right
regime are allowed under current legislation, although few of
them allow to ‘enforce’ an easement upon a spectrum
licensees. For instance, the ACMA is allowed to issue
apparatus licences in spectrum designated for spectrum
licensing under special circumstances; or to defence, law
enforcement and emergency personnel. In the normal course
of events an access seeker to an easement to a spectrum
licence is expected to negotiate a third party authorisation
from the primary licensee. The alternative, of an easement by
way of an apparatus licence under special circumstances has
been used in a small number of cases such as short-term trials
of equipment.
Class licences issued before spectrum licensing processes
commence are also able to continue after spectrum licences
are issued but this approach has not been used by the ACMA.
Collective command and control arrangements are used
extensively in Australia. Here flexible rights are granted for
restricted collective use under an administrative licence.
Apparatus licences are granted for two-way radio systems that
can be used anywhere in Australia (or in a State). The service
is not flexible, but the technology can vary, digital or analogue
for example, provided the channel width is adhered to. Many
systems are licensed on each channel used for this purpose
and licensees are expected to coordinate with one another on a
no interference no protection basis. These licences are
commonly held by companies that provide two way radio
services to sporting or cultural events.
The related common pool regime, where coordination rules
are set and enforced by community management has not been
used in Australia.
A regulated easement is an easement under a command and
control licensing arrangement. This is a quite common
arrangement. Class licences are issued underneath apparatus
licensed bands, with usually only power restrictions on the
operation of devices under the class licence.
Eased command and control and flexi-eased command and
control are also common in Australia. The degree of neutrality
in both apparatus and class licences can vary considerably,
and both allow easements. For example, a class licence may
specify both a power level and a service (e.g. wireless
microphones or only a power level). An apparatus licence may
specify a service and a technology, or only a service.
EXTENT OF USE OF DSA TECHNOLOGIES IN AUSTRALIA
The extent of DSA technology use in Australia is currently
limited. The Jindalee over-the-horizon radar is a high profile
example. This system developed in Australia for defence and
security purposes roams over the HF band avoiding
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interference to some users on a dynamic basis and avoiding
sensitive bands all together.
UWB for ground penetrating radar has been authorised by a
non assigned apparatus licence. The licensing of these systems
posed a number of problems for the Australian regulator.
These systems operated over bands designated for spectrum
licensing and legislation prevented them from being
authorised by a class licence. Apparatus licences could have
been issued to individual licensees but would have had to pass
the test in legislation of being special circumstances to coexist
with the spectrum licences. Also the current apparatus licence
fee schedule does not make allowance for sharing, and the
standard formula, where fees are proportional to bandwidth,
would have resulted in a very high fee.
The fee formula causes other distortions to the way systems
are licensed. Space licences for communicating with satellites
are sometimes issued to a company that leases transponder
capacity on a satellite owned by a foreign operator, which for
reasons of its own does not wish to apply for licences itself.
The licensee may only use 27 MHz bandwidth at any one time
but the centre frequency may vary over 500 MHz, depending
on the transponder used. These are typically licensed as a
27 MHz band width system, with a frequency at the centre of
the 500 MHz range. This provides an appropriate fee, but it
provides little guidance to the actual frequencies used. If this
practice became widespread with DSA technologies, the use
of the register of licences for frequency assigning would
rapidly diminish.
A number of DSA technologies, such as cognitive channel
selecting technologies, are already authorised by class
licences. Examples include WiFi, DECT cordless telephone
systems, RLAN point-to-point backhaul links used to connect
RLAN and broadband networks to other networks on 5.8
GHz, as well as biomedical telemetry technologies such as
medical implant devices operating on a number of bands
under the Low Interference Potential Devices (LIPD) Class
License.
AUSTRALIA’S REGULATORY READINESS FOR DSA
The readiness of the Australian regime to deal with the
extensive use of DSA technologies is like the proverbial
curate’s egg—good in parts and therefore unsatisfactory as a
whole. Consequently, it needs reviewed in its entirety to
provide the most efficient regulatory outcomes.
The apparatus and class licensing regimes can be readily
adapted to deal with DSA technologies. In deciding whether
to issue an apparatus licence, the Act specifies that the ACMA
must take into account the effect on radiocommunications of
issuing the licence. Class licences may be issued to manage
the spectrum in bands not subject to spectrum licensing. It is a
simple administrative matter for the regulator to authorise
DSA technologies under apparatus or class licensing. The

regulator may specify sharing conditions and technology
standards to enable their effective use.
Spectrum licences were established in the Act as a marketbased system of spectrum management. In order to provide
explicit rights of spectrum access, coexistence of other
licences over the same spectrum space as spectrum licences
was very restricted. It was thus established as a pure property
rights regime with no flexibility for the regulator to
experiment with intermediate solutions. The regulator has
little discretion to allow DSA technologies; they can only be
introduced by agreement with the spectrum licensee.
As mentioned above, there has been a marked reluctance by
spectrum licensees to allow access by secondary users. This
has the potential to severely restrict the efficient use of DSA
technology over important parts of the spectrum.
If Australia is to fully benefit from the transformational
potential of DSA technologies, it will need a review of the
legislative provisions surrounding spectrum licensing. This
will be no easy task. Market-based reforms of spectrum
management in Australia have been very successful on the
whole. It will require ingenuity to develop a robust reform
package that keeps the benefits of these reforms, while
enabling the efficient use of DSA technologies.
CONCLUSIONS
Thanks to legislative reforms in the early 1990s, Australia
already has much discretion in the design of its
radiocommunications licences. However, this resilience was
developed within the legal boundaries of a trichotomic
licensing regime, not through the expanded discretion offered
by a bespoke licensing approach. Some intermediary regimes,
such as Flexi-eased C&C (a C&C ancestor to spectrum
licences) have been used quite successfully. Other regimes,
such as private parks and privately-run commons (offshoots of
spectrum licences) are authorised regimes under the Act but
have seen no or little action in practice.
Potential regulatory solutions to the issues raised in this
paper include wider adoption of intermediary regimes
identified in the previous sections. Implementing these
regimes with a set of ready-to-use DSA technologies could
help resolve the stalemate between too much exclusivity (i.e.
spectrum idleness issues) and excessive usage (i.e. quality of
service issues). However, as discussed, some of these regimes
are not yet authorised under the Act. Those intermediary
regimes that could be implemented without legal amendments
(e.g. the Private Parks) may need to be further promoted
among stakeholders. Those regimes which are not authorised
under the Act (e.g. enforced easement to spectrum-licensed
spaces) may need the development of a new set of legislated
rules.
The more flexible, adaptable and responsive the regulatory
framework, the better it will be in rising to the challenges that
will increasingly confront spectrum policy makers. In turn,
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this will improve the allocative, dynamic and technical
efficiency of the radiofrequency spectrum. In particular, the
development and implementation of a more sophisticated
approach to licensing regimes will allow the effective and
efficient exploitation of more sophisticated technologies such
as DSA.
To conclude, the Act was designed to provide an efficient
regulatory regime for the conditions applicable or anticipated
at the time it was passed in 1992. The Act has coped
admirably with challenges that have arisen in the intervening
18 years. However, it seems clear that a review of (at least)
the licensing regimes established by the Act has the potential
to significantly increase the efficient allocation and use of the
radiofrequency spectrum in Australia by transformational
technologies such as DSA.
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